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Incentives versus Sorting in Tournaments: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment
*
 
A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order 
tournaments. Evidence comes from experiments in laboratories and non-experimental 
studies exploiting sports or firm data. Selection of competitors across tournaments may bias 
these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit 
the external validity of results obtained in lab experiments or from sports data. To address 
these concerns we conducted a field experiment where students selected themselves into 
tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing student on the 
final exam of a standard introductory microeconomics course could win a substantial financial 
reward. A standard non-experimental analysis exploiting across tournament variation in 
reward size and competitiveness confirms earlier findings. We find however no evidence for 
effects of tournament participation on study effort and exam results when we exploit our 
experimental design, indicating that the non-experimental results are completely due to 
sorting. Treatment only affects attendance of the first workgroup meeting following the 
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Rank-order tournaments as analyzed in Lazear and Rosen (1981) are widely viewed
as labor market contracts that describe and explain relevant features of compensa-
tion and incentive structures in organizations. These tournaments are characterized
by the evaluation of individual performance relative to the performance of competi-
tors. Unlike piece rates, tournaments induce optimal eﬀort in circumstances where
absolute productivity is diﬃcult to observe but where relative performance mea-
sures are more readily available. A pay-oﬀ scheme based on relative productivity
is also attractive in situations where common shocks aﬀect the productivity of all
individuals.
Empirical support for tournament theory comes from various sources. First,
there are a several studies that use data from ﬁrms or executive pay. An example
is Eriksson (1999), who uses data from Danish ﬁrms to test among other things
whether pay diﬀerentials between job levels are consistent with relative compensa-
tion, whether pay dispersion is higher in more noisy environments, and whether pay
dispersion is aﬀected by the number of participants. His analyses support most of
the theoretical predictions. As Becker and Huselid (1992) point out, tournament
structures are more likely to exist where individuals’ absolute eﬀort or performance
is diﬃcult or costly to observe. Studies based on ﬁrm data therefore do not conduct
direct tests of the incentive eﬀects of tournaments but typically test some of the
indirect implications of the tournament model. Gibbs (1995) criticizes such indirect
tests of the tournament model by arguing that (many of) the indirect implications
of the tournament model are also consistent with a model in which ﬁrms require a
threshold level for performance in order to be promoted to the next rank.
A second important source for empirical support for tournament theory comes
from studies where sports events are analyzed in terms of rank-order tournaments.
This line of research started with the papers of Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b)
dealing with professional golf. Both papers regress players’ ﬁnal score in a tour-
nament on the total available prize money with control variables for diﬃculty of
the course, weather conditions, players’ ability and opponents’ quality. Both papers
also regress ﬁnal-round scores on proxies of players’ marginal returns to eﬀort. The
results of these analyses typically provide support for tournament theory: the level
and structure of prizes inﬂuence players’ performance.1 Following Ehrenberg and
1The results in Orszag (1994) cast doubt on the validity of the ﬁndings reported in Ehrenberg
and Bognanno (1990a). Orszag replicates their analysis using data from another tour, and ﬁnds
no eﬀect of total prize money on performance. Further analysis reveals that in the data used
by Ehrenberg and Bognanno, the (self-rated) weather data are not orthogonal to the prize money
variable. Orszag concludes that "perhaps golf is not the ideal example to study tournament theory,
1Bognanno’s lead, models inspired on tournament theory have been applied to data
from other sports including professional bowling (Abrevaya, 2002; Bognanno, 1990),
tennis (Sunde, 2003) and auto racing (Becker and Huselid, 1992). The results of all
these studies are in support of tournament theory.
A third group of studies is based on laboratory experiments, starting with Bull
et al. (1987). In this study over 200 undergraduate students volunteered to partici-
pate in one of the ten treatments of this study. Treatments vary features as the prize
spread, asymmetry of costs and information conditions. The main ﬁnding of this
study is that while behavior is on average in agreement with theoretical predictions
there is a very large variance of behavior at the individual level. This is not the case
in the piece rate treatment in which some of the subjects participated. Moreover,
low ability (high cost) subjects tend to choose higher eﬀort levels than predicted.
The authors hypothesize that these deviating ﬁndings are due to the game nature
of tournaments (in the laboratory). Van Dijk et al. (2001) conducted a laboratory
experiment to contrast the performance of piece-rates schemes, team incentives and
tournaments.2 Their ﬁndings regarding tournaments are very similar to those ob-
tained by Bull et al. (1987). They too, report a large variance in behavior under
tournaments and low ability subjects exerting too much eﬀort.3
The evidence from sports events and from laboratory experiments is often used
as the basis for rather strong statements concerning the desirability of tournaments.
For instance, Van Dijk et al. (2001) conclude that "[f]rom the perspective of an
employer, relative payment schemes would therefore [higher eﬀort on average] be
superior." (p.208). Likewise, Becker and Huselid (1992) state that: "Employers
want to encourage employees to take risks and to be entrepreneurial, but not to be
careless in their actions. It would appear that tournament reward systems have the
potential to achieve these goals" (p.348), or "[t]ournament systems have considerable
motivational properties" (p.348).
It is unclear whether this kind of inference can be based on behavior observed
in the laboratory or in sports events. These test environments are rather limited
representations of the actual situations people have in mind when they talk about the
incentive eﬀects of tournaments (competing for a promotion in an organization, to
or perhaps tournament theory does not elicit the desired incentive results."
2A novel feature of their experimental design is that subjects have to provide real eﬀort (search-
ing the maximum in a grid) rather than just choose a number from an eﬀort-cost table.
3Other studies using laboratory experiments include Schotter and Weigelt (1992) who study
the eﬀects of aﬃrmative action programs in a tournament setting, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003)
who focus on the eﬀects of diﬀerent tournament sizes and diﬀerent prize structures, and Freeman
and Gelber (2006) who examine the eﬀects of inequality in rewards and diﬀerent provision of
information.
2become CEO, etc.). A ﬁrst important diﬀerence is the lack of potentially distracting
factors which may side track people. A second important diﬀerence is the duration
of the task at hand. Subjects in laboratory experiments spend at most two or three
hours on their task, and also sports events are characterized by short periods of
intense competition with relatively large amounts of time between such events. In
contrast, the interaction between employees at a particular hierarchical level who
compete for promotion to the next level, can easily take some years. Levitt and
List (2007) argue that the psychology literature shows that there are important
diﬀerences between short-run (hot) and long-run (cold) decision making. In the hot
phase, emotions can be very important, while these can be suppressed in the cold
phase. Gneezy and List (2006), for example, consider gift exchange experiments that
have been popular in laboratory experiments. When they run such experiments in
a natural setting they ﬁnd that employees’ positive responses to employers’ gifts
consisting of high wages are only short-lived.
A further element that limits the external validity of experimental results is
related to sorting. Inspired by the ﬁnding that some experiments conducted in the
laboratory report high variance in behavior, Eriksson et al. (2006) show that this
is an artifact of the designs implemented in these laboratory experiments. They
argue that in reality participants self-select into tournaments. Consequently, in
their laboratory experiment they let their subjects choose between payment schemes
(tournament versus piece-rates) and ﬁnd that the variance in behavior is reduced
in comparison to a situation in which choice is not possible. Lazear et al. (2006)
show that introducing sorting aﬀects observed sharing behavior in dictator game
experiments.
Where the absence of sorting in laboratory experiments limits their external
validity, the presence of sorting poses econometric challenges to the analysis of nat-
urally occurring data. Lazear and Rosen (1981) observed that "[i]n the real world,
where there is population heterogeneity, market participants are sorted into diﬀer-
ent contests. There players (and horses, for that matter) who are known to be of
higher quality ex ante may play in games with higher stakes" (fn.5). Studies using
ﬁeld data typically ignore such selectivity and at most assume that all selection is
on observables which may severely bias the conclusions. We organized a ﬁeld exper-
iment in a naturally occurring setting to test the incentive eﬀects of tournaments
and these confounding eﬀects of sorting.
In our experiment students enrolled in a standard introductory microeconomics
course could win a substantial prize for having the most correct answers on the
course’s ﬁnal (multiple choice) exam. The setup of our experiment is such that
3participants had to select themselves into a tournament with a low prize (1000
Euros), a medium prize (3000 Euros) or a high prize (5000 Euros). Within each
tournament participants were then randomly assigned to a treatment group and a
control group. In each tournament the prize was won by the student in the treatment
group who performed best at the exam. Students in the control groups could not
win a prize.
We conducted this experiment two years in a row (in the academic years 2004/5
and 2005/6). The exam consisted of 35 multiple-choice questions. The number of
correct answers on the exam is our measure of productivity. During the course we
registered participants’ attendance of the course’s workgroups, and at the end of the
exam we asked them how much time they spent preparing for the exam. These are
our measures of eﬀort.
The period between the announcement of this ﬁeld experiment and the day of
the ﬁnal exam is 3 months. While this period is shorter than the "several years"
involved in a tournament to become a ﬁrm’s CEO, it is substantially longer than the
"two or three hours" of a typical laboratory experiment or a sport event. To assess
the confounding eﬀect of sorting we contrast our experimental ﬁnding with a non-
experimental empirical analysis that exploits across tournament variation in prize
money and group size which has been the common way of testing tournament theory
using sports data, where players choose in which tournaments they participate.
We ﬁnd only very little evidence that the prospect of winning a prize aﬀected
students’ eﬀort. The exception is that treated students are signiﬁcantly more likely
to attend the ﬁrst workgroup meeting immediately after assignment to treatment
and control groups was announced. But there is no eﬀect on attendance of subse-
quent workgroup meetings or on the amount of time spent preparing for the exam.
Consistent with this, we also ﬁnd no eﬀect on students’ achievement; not on its mean
level and also not when we focus on students in the top of the achievement and abil-
ity distributions. This is in stark contract with the non-experimental analysis of our
data which leads to the (erroneous) conclusion that higher rewards generate higher
productivity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
design of our ﬁeld experiment. Section 3 presents and discusses the results. Section
4 relates our ﬁndings to previous empirical tests of rank-order tournaments and
concludes.
42 Experimental Design and Data
The subject pool in our ﬁeld experiment is drawn from two cohorts of ﬁrst-year
students in economics and business at the University of Amsterdam. The ﬁrst
cohort entered in the academic year 2004/2005, the second entered in 2005/2006.
During the ﬁrst year of their three years bachelor program all students follow exactly
the same program of 14 compulsory courses for a total of 60 credits.4
Students follow a standard introductory microeconomics course in the second
term of the ﬁrst year. The course is worth 7 credits, which implies a nominal
study-load of 196 hours. The course was taught over a period of seven weeks in
November and December. The exam was held at the end of January and consisted
of 35 multiple choice questions. During each of the seven course weeks, there was
a two-hours central lecture for all students together on Monday, and there were
two two-hours workgroup meetings on Tuesday/Thursday or Wednesday/Friday.
Attendance of the central lecture and the workgroup meetings is not compulsory.
We invited the students to participate in the ﬁeld experiment during the ﬁrst cen-
tral lecture of the course, which was held in a lecture hall with almost all students
present. We explained that we would be organizing three separate tournaments.
Within each tournament the student who answered most multiple-choice questions
correctly at the exam would be declared the winner and would receive a prize.5
The prize diﬀered between tournaments, and was 1000, 3000 and 5000 euros respec-
tively. It was made clear that students could participate in one tournament, and
therefore had to choose the prize for which they wanted to compete. After having
chosen their preferred tournament, one out of two students was randomly selected
to actually participate in the tournament. Students that were randomized into the
tournament would therefore compete with other students that had i) selected the
same tournament and, ii) were also randomized into the treatment. The size and
composition of each tournament is therefore endogenously determined. Since our
randomization scheme randomizes half of the students out of the treatment we have
a control group for each tournament. This means that we can estimate the incen-
tive eﬀect for each separate tournament, but across tournament comparison will
be confounded by the self-selection of students. This setup allows us to contrast
experimental and non-experimental results.
Students could apply to participate by ﬁlling out a form that asked them their
name, age, gender, math score in secondary school, the prize they wanted to partic-
4There are no diﬀerence in the program between the two years.
5If the highest score in a tournament was shared by more than one student, then the prize was
divided among these students.
5Table 1: Numbers of participants [test-taking participants]
2004 2005
Treated Controls Treated Controls
1000 prize 25 [23] 25 [24] 32 [32] 32 [29]
3000 prize 59 [51] 58 [51] 58 [50] 58 [55]
5000 prize 56 [48] 58 [48] 69 [64] 69 [67]
All 140 [122] 141 [123] 159 [146] 159 [151]
ipate for, their subjective evaluation of how well they expected to do on the exam
relative to others, and their consent to link information from the experiment to in-
formation from the students’ administration.6 Application forms were distributed
during the break of the ﬁrst lecture and, for students not attending this lecture,
also during the workgroups in the ﬁrst week. Forms had to be handed in no later
than 17h00 of the Friday of the ﬁrst course week. The result of the randomization
of students to the treatment and control group was announced at the start of the
second week, during the central lecture in the lecture hall on Monday and on the
teaching website on the intranet.7
Interestingly, the participants in this ﬁeld experiment are recruited from the
same population as the subjects usually participating in laboratory experiments.
Hence, the diﬀerences that we will report between the results emerging from labo-
ratory experiments and the results emerging from our study cannot be explained by
systematic diﬀerences in subject pool. Moreover, with a subject pool of students in
economics and business, we give the predictions of tournament theory a fair chance
since these ﬁelds are likely to attract students who are more competitive and more
sensitive to ﬁnancial incentives than the average person in the population (Carter
and Irons, 1991; Frank et al., 2000).
Table 1 shows how the participants in the experiment sorted themselves over the
three tournaments, separately for both years. It also shows how many students in
each group took the exam. In both years around 20 percent of the participants opted
for the tournament with the low (1000 Euros) prize. The remaining 80 percent split
about equally over the other two tournaments. The sizes of the tournaments (which
6The question asking about students’ subjective rank reads: "Assume that this reward experi-
ment would not take place. Out of 100 randomly chosen ﬁrst-year economics and business students
in this university, how many do you expect to perform better on the microeconomics exam than
you?" For the purpose of the analysis we reversed the ordering of this measure so that a higher
score means a better subjective rank.
7In an ideal situation subjects are unaware of participating in an experiment. In the context
of the current ﬁeld experiment this was, however, not feasible because students in treatment and
control groups interact.
6Table 2: Balancing of treated and controls by tournament - pre-treatment variables
1000 3000 5000
Treated Controls Treated Controls Treated Controls
Age 19.23 19.36 19.44 19.59 19.48 19.63
Male 0.61 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.73
Math 7.12 7.08 7.25 7.27 7.31 7.44
Credits 6.42 6.42 7.10 6.34 7.09 6.95
GPA 5.49 5.40 5.76 5.47 5.88 5.91
Subjective Rank 60.95 60.23 62.5 66.53 65.07 65.33
Attendance pre 1.63 1.53 1.54 1.47 1.51 1.48
were communicated to the participants) are relevant as they indicate the number of
competitors for those who were assigned to the treatment groups.
From the administrative record of the university we received for each participant
in the experiment the results on the exams they took in the ﬁrst term. These ﬁrst
term scores and the mathematics grade students obtained at the centralized matric-
ulation exam for secondary school serve as measures of ability. The score on the
microeconomics exam is our measure of productivity. The subjective rank reported
by the student in the form at the start of the experiment can also be a measure of
ability, but it may also capture elements of motivation. Furthermore, the instructors
of all workgroups kept track of students’ attendance of the workgroups. Finally, we
added an extra question at the end of the exam that asked students to report how
many hours they spent preparing for the exam. Workgroup attendance and exam
preparation are our measures of eﬀort. Having not only data on productivity but
also on eﬀort make the data quite unique for a empirical investigation of tournament
theory. Data from sports tournaments are often restricted to either a measure for
eﬀort or a measure for productivity, while in laboratory experiments productivity is
equal to eﬀort plus some noise term. Gender and age are used as control variables.
For the assignment of students to the treatment and control group, we use strat-
iﬁed randomization based on high school math score. We constructed subsamples of
students with similar math scores and divided within each subsample the students
equally over the treatment and control group. The main reason for using stratiﬁed
randomization is to reduce the risk of ending up with an unequal distribution of
ability between treatment and control groups. Table 2 presents sample means of
pre-treatment variables for treatment and control groups separately for each tour-
nament. With the exception of subjective rank in the 3000 tournament which is
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, none of the diﬀerences between treated and con-
trols is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 10%-level or better based on chi-square tests for
7Table 3: OLS estimation results for diﬀerences between tournaments; Treated and
Controls
Age Male Math score Credits GPA Rank
3000 prize 0:22 0:067 0:16 0:29 0:16 4:05
(0:17) (0:054) (0:14) (0:53) (0:18) (2:08)
5000 prize 0:26 0:084 0:27 0:60 0:45 4:64
(0:17) (0:053) (0:14) (0:52) (0:18) (2:06)
Year 2005 0:04 0:002  0:04  0:24  0:30 2:57
(0:12) (0:037) (0:10) (0:38) (0:13) (1:50)
Intercept 19:27 0:648 7:13 6:55 5:61 59:14
(0:16) (0:049) (0:13) (0:48) (0:16) (1:90)
Note: Robust standard errors for dummy dependent variables. *) signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level. **) signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. ***) signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
gender and on t-tests for the other variables. The main message from this table is
that within each tournament, treated and controls are balanced in terms of their
observed characteristics. This is to be expected given the random assignment to
treatment and control groups.
Table 2 also indicates that students with better math scores and who performed
better in the ﬁrst term (more credits collected and a higher GPA) are more likely to
choose a tournament with a higher prize. This provides some evidence that higher
ability students are more likely to self-select in the higher prize tournament. This is
also expressed in students’ subjective position, students who rank themselves higher
seem to be more likely to choose a higher prize tournament.
To investigate the sorting of students into the diﬀerent tournaments we regressed
individual characteristics and the diﬀerent ability measures on the students’ tour-
nament choices. In Table 3 we show the results from the OLS regressions where the
data are pooled for the two years. The main result is that more able students tend
to select themselves into the tournaments with the higher prizes. Students in the
higher prize tournaments have on average better high school math scores and scored
higher grades in the ﬁrst term. Students who opted for a tournament with a higher
prize also tend to report a higher perceived position in the exam score distribution.
For GPA these diﬀerences are also signiﬁcant between the 3000 and the 5000 euro
tournament. Finally, one can conclude from the table that there are no substantial
diﬀerences in student populations between the two years in which the experiment
was conducted in terms of gender and age. Students in 2005 scored lower grades in
the ﬁrst term than students from the 2004 cohort, suggesting that the former are
on average less able than the latter.
Recently studies have documented gender diﬀerences in competitive behavior
8Table 4: OLS estimation results for diﬀerences between tournaments; Controls only
Took exam Exam score Pass rate Attendance Preparation hours
3000 prize  0:011 0:06  0:035 0:14  3:99
(0:043) (0:84) (0:077) (0:65) (3:27)
5000 prize  0:023 2:56 0:110 0:62  3:16
(0:043) (0:82) (0:077) (0:61) (3:27)
Year 2005 0:077  3:34  0:192 0:63 5:63
(0:033) (0:60) (0:055) (0:46) (2:26)
Intercept 0:886 20:56 0:458 5:82 23:46
(0:037) (0:76) (0:072) (0:58) (2:78)
Note: Robust standard errors for dummy outcome variables. **) signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
***) signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
(e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004) and suggested that they
may explain gender gaps in the labor market. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) let
participants in a laboratory experement choose between a piece rate and a tour-
nament. They ﬁnd that men are twice more likely to choose the tournament than
women. Interestingly we do not ﬁnd important diﬀerences between men and women
with respect to sorting between tournaments.
Further evidence for the sorting of students comes from investigating the stu-
dents in the control group. Since the students in the control group are not aﬀected
by the tournament, diﬀerences in eﬀort or productivity between students who se-
lected into diﬀerent tournaments are due to sorting. Table 4 shows the results from
OLS regressions of outcome measures on tournament choice. The most important
result is that students in the 5000 euro tournament score signiﬁcantly better at the
exam than other students. The productivity of these students is therefore higher
independently of the ﬁnancial incentives of the tournament scheme. There are how-
ever no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in average eﬀort between the students in the diﬀerent
tournaments. In 2005 students prepared more for the exam and also a larger share
of the students participated in the exam, but the pass rate and average exam score
were signiﬁcantly lower than in 2004.8
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the exam score distribution in the popula-
tion (of controls) and the upper panel provides additional evidence with respect to
sorting by plotting the cumulative distributions of the exam score distributions of
the participants assigned to the control groups for each tournament separately. The
distribution of the 5000 league clearly stochastically dominates those of the 1000
and 3000 leagues. The ordering of the 1000 and 3000 distributions is not monotonic
8Note that this does not aﬀect our results given the experimental setup of the data.
9Figure 1: Exam score distributions in the control groups
in prize money, although above the mean (20) the cumulative distribution of the
3000 league dominates the 1000 league. Finally Figure 1 shows that the distribu-
tions overlap substantially even though the correlation between the means of the
exam score distributions of the controls and the size of the reward across the six
tournaments is nearly perfect.
Having participants sort themselves into tournaments may also reduce hetero-
geneity of participants within tournaments compared to the overall population. The-
ory predicts that a more homogeneous pool of competitors will, other things equal,
induce more eﬀort of participants. Table 5 shows to what extent heterogeneity has
been reduced. First we show the standard deviation in math score for the complete
population in each year and for each tournament in each year. Within each group
the standard deviation in math scores is not much lower than in the total popula-
tion. For participants assigned to the control groups, the table shows the standard
deviation of the exam score within each tournament and overall. Participants in
the low and high prize tournaments experience a reduction in heterogeneity relative
to what they would experience in a randomly selected group, participants in the
medium prize tournaments in contrast are confronted with a more heterogeneous
group of competitors. Overall we observe, however, a reduction in heterogeneity.
The ﬁnal columns of the table report the standard deviations that would have been
realized if participants would have been assigned to tournaments on the basis of
their math scores (where the fraction of individuals in each tournament matches the
actual distribution). Compared to the assignment on math score, participants’ self-
selection led to more homogeneous high prize tournaments and less homogeneous
10Table 5: Within tournament heterogeneity and sorting – Standard deviations
Math Score - All Exam Score - Controls
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
1000 prize 1.25 1.31 4.47 4.77 4.42 4.16
3000 prize 1.29 1.19 5.33 5.51 4.08 4.94
5000 prize 1.24 1.22 4.81 4.51 5.64 4.79
Pooled 1.26 1.23 5.22 5.00 5.22 5.00
Average 1.26 1.22 4.96 4.93 4.80 4.73
Tournament Actual Actual Assigned
medium and low prize tournaments.
3 Results
We start with a non-experimental analysis of our data, meaning that we will ignore
the fact that we have a control group and use across tournament variation in prize
money and group size to estimate incentive eﬀects. After which we analyze the
eﬀects of exposure to tournament incentives on participants’ eﬀort and on their
productivity exploiting the experimental design.
3.1 Non-experimental analysis
Empirical papers using data from sports or companies only have information on
those individuals who actually play for the prize. In the spirit of these type of non-
experimental analyses we restrict the analysis to participants who were assigned to
the treatment group and thus could win a prize. We follow Ehrenberg and Bognanno
(1990a) and estimate regressions of the following form
yi = pi + ni + x
0
i + "i (1)
where yi is student’s i performance on the exam, pi is the size of the reward in
the tournament the student is participating in, ni the number of competitors the
student faces, and ﬁnally controls xi, which may include ability, or ability relative
to the competitors. Table 6 shows estimates of (1) using diﬀerent sets of covariates.
The ﬁrst regression, which does not include any ability and tournament control
variables, shows a positive eﬀect of reward size on productivity but this eﬀect is
small and lacks signiﬁcance. Recall that the tournament with larger prices tend to
have more competitors, which suggests that the coeﬃcient in column (1) is likely to
11Table 6: Regressions of score on reward size for treated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prize Money/1000 0:318 1:118 1:023 1:094
(0:223) (0:445) (0:415) (0:415)




Ability   AbilityCompetitors 1:801
(0:245)
R-squared 0:01 0:03 0:21 0:20
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations equals 260. **) signif-
icant at 5 percent level, ***) signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
be downward biased. This is conﬁrmed by the second column where we control for
the number of competitors in the tournament. The eﬀect of the reward size increases
and signiﬁcantly diﬀers from zero. The point estimate suggests that productivity
goes up by one correct response (around 0.2 of a standard deviation in the score)
for each 1000 euros increase in the prize. At the same time about ten additional
competitors decrease the number of correct responses by one.
One might still be concerned by remaining omitted variable bias. Especially
ability bias arising from sorting where higher prize tournaments attract more able
participants is a concern. We can however control for participants’ ability (math
score) since we collected information on math grades students obtained at high
school matriculation. Column (3) shows the results from this speciﬁcation. The R-
squared increases substantially conﬁrming that the math score is a good measure of
ability while at the same time the impact estimate on prize money remains similar.
Finally, one might argue that what matters is not so much ability, but rather ability
relative to the competitors in the tournament. In the ﬁnal column the math score is
therefore replaced by the diﬀerence between participants’ own math score and the
average math score of their competitors in the tournament.9 We again ﬁnd that
average productivity goes up by one correct response for each 1000 euros increase
in prize money.
9This last speciﬁcation is very similar to the speciﬁcations in the papers of Ehrenberg and
Bognanno. The diﬀerence is that they include own ability and the mean of competitors’ ability as
separate regressors. In our data these variables suﬀer from multicollinearity since the correlation
between the mean math score of competitors and the size of the reward equals 0.83. Including the
diﬀerence in math scores circumvents this multicollinearity problem and at the same time captures
the spirit of the speciﬁcations in Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b).
12The results in Table 6 support the predictions of the tournament model: we
ﬁnd that an increase in reward size and a decrease in the number of competitors
enhance productivity. In the remainder of this section we will show that these
conclusions are not conﬁrmed by analyses that use the control groups for inference,
and are in fact an artifact of participants’ self-selection into tournaments. These
conclusions are also conﬁrmed when we estimate the regressions in Table 6 on the
sample of participants who were assigned to the control groups and were therefore
not exposed to the tournament incentives. Using these observations the “eﬀects”
of rewards are even larger, and the point estimate in the ﬁrst column is already
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
3.2 Experimental results
We now turn to the experimental results of the paper. Using the control groups
we can estimate the causal eﬀect of participating in the tournaments on eﬀort and
productivity.
Our measures of eﬀort are attendance per workgroup meeting, aggregate work-
group attendance and time spent (in hours) preparing for the exam. In Table 7 we
show results from equations in which the various eﬀort measures are regressed on
a single treatment dummy. The set of control variables consists of age, a dummy
for gender, math score, subjective rank and dummies for reward size and cohort.
We do not ﬁnd any impact on both preparation time for the exam and on total
workgroup attendance. However, when we split up workgroup attendance and con-
sider the impact on separate meetings, we see that the treatment eﬀect for the ﬁrst
meeting is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (at the 5%-level): treated participants
were 7 percentage points (at a base of 74 percent) more likely to attend the ﬁrst
meeting than the controls. This suggests diﬀerent behavior in the short-run (hot)
and in the long-run (cold).
Given that there appear to be no (lasting) eﬀects of treatment on eﬀort we should
not expect any impact on productivity, unless our measures of eﬀort do not pick up
all relevant dimensions. This could be the case if the tournament incentives do not
change the extensive margin but rather the intensive margin of study time, i.e. the
eﬃciency of time spent studying.
Table 8 reports the eﬀects of treatment on two measures of productivity: a binary
indicator for taking the exam and and the actual exam score, which is the number
of correct responses to the 35 multiple choice questions. The results are consistent
with the ﬁndings for eﬀort: we ﬁnd no indication of any impact of the treatment on
mean productivity.





- 1st meeting 0:067(0:034)
- 2nd meeting  0:008(0:037)
- 3rd meeting  0:014(0:036)
- 4th meeting  0:001(0:037)
- 5th meeting  0:041(0:038)
- 6th meeting 0:047(0:037)
- 7th meeting  0:029(0:039)
- 8th meeting 0:042(0:038)
- 9th meeting  0:019(0:039)
- 10th meeting 0:027(0:039)
- 11th meeting  0:023(0:040)
- 12th meeting 0:027(0:038)
Note: Each estimate comes from a separate lin-
ear probability regression. The speciﬁcation con-
trols for age, gender, math and subjective rank
and dummies for reward size, year and atten-
dance during the workgroups before randomiza-
tion. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Number of observations equals 574, except in ﬁrst
row where only 512 test-takers are included. **)
signiﬁcant at 5 percent level.
Table 8: Mean eﬀect estimates on productivity
Test taking Exam Score
1000 prize 0.032 (0.044) 0.974 (0.877)
3000 prize -0.057 (0.043) 1.184 (0.617)
5000 prize -0.026 (0.037) -0.629 (0.644)
Pooled -0.027 (0.024) 0.383 (0.403)
Note: Each cell comes from a separate regression.
Controls are the same as in Table 7. Standard





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15Incentives in the experiment are given by rewarding the highest exam score in
each tournament. One might therefore expect that especially exam scores at the
top of the distributions are aﬀected by exposure to treatment. To examine this
we ranked within each tournament all exam scores from the highest to the lowest
separately for control and treatment groups. The left part of Table 9 reports the
sums of the ranks of the top 3, the top 5 and the top 10 for the controls and the
treated in each tournament. The p-values of ranksum tests are reported in the ﬁnal
columns in these panels. Each separate test is based on only 6, 10 or 20 observations
and has therefore limited power. By pooling data from the separate tournaments
we achieve more power. The p-values of the tests on the sum of ranksums are in
the bottom right cell of each panel in the table. These p-values indicate that also
at the top ends of the exam score distributions no treatment eﬀects are found.
The right part of the table repeats the same analysis but now participants have
been ordered on the basis of their ability (math score). Here too, we ﬁnd no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between students exposed to treatment and those in the control
group. This conclusion does not change when we order students on their subjective
rank.
We also investigated gender diﬀerences in performance (not reported here). Just
like we did not ﬁnd diﬀerences in sorting behavior between men and women, we do
not observe diﬀerences between the genders in performance either. Women do not
perform worse than men in the tournaments, and women who compete (treated) do
not perform worse than women who do not compete (controls). Again, this contrasts
with the ﬁndings of Gneezy et al. (2003); Gneezy and Rustichini (2004); Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007) who all ﬁnd that compared to men women underperform
when they ﬁnd themselves in a competitive environment.
4 Conclusion
We conducted a ﬁeld experiment to test key predictions of rank-order tournaments
in a natural setting where participants are potentially exposed to various natural
distracters. To make the pool of competitors in tournaments more homogeneous
and to mimic a realistic feature of real-world tournaments, we let participants sort
themselves into tournaments with diﬀerent reward sizes.
Our main ﬁndings are that:
1. Participants of higher quality select into tournaments with higher rewards;
2. Those who could win a prize were more likely to attend the ﬁrst workgroup
meeting immediately following the announcement of assignment to treatment
16and control groups. Exposure to treatment has, however, no lasting impact
on workgroup attendance or exam preparation;
3. Exposure to treatment has no eﬀect on students’ productivity, nor on its mean
level and neither when we focus on students in the top of the achievement and
ability distributions;
4. A non-experimental analysis of our data falsely leads to the conclusion that
higher rewards generate higher productivity. Instead the positive correlation
between productivity and reward size is due to sorting.
Our ﬁndings contrast sharply with results from previous studies that empirically
test the predictions of tournament theory. These studies almost invariably ﬁnd that
participants in tournaments choose their eﬀort and/or realize productivity in line
with the predictions of that theory. As the discussion in the introduction makes
clear, the previous studies that measure eﬀort and/or productivity use either data
obtained in the laboratory or data gathered from sports events.
Our preferred explanation for the diﬀerence between our ﬁndings and the ﬁndings
from laboratory experiments is that in laborartory experiments tasks are of short
duration and participants can do nothing besides performing the task at hand,
whereas the participants in our ﬁeld experiment had many alternative uses of their
time. Once subjects in laboratory experiments have entered the laboratory they
know that they will be there for the next two or three hours. The only use of time
available to them is to play the game.
The same explanation applies to the diﬀerence between our ﬁndings and the
results from sport events. Professional golf players for example know that once they
are on the green they have to play the nine or 18 holes. Again, there is no alternative
to playing the game. Additionally, ﬁndings from sports events can be biased due to
sorting, just as the non-experimental results reported in this paper.
The duration of our ﬁeld experiment is three months from its announcement to
the ﬁnal exam. While a period of three months is clearly shorter than the perhaps
years involved in tournaments in organizational life, it is closer to that context than
laboratory experiments or sports events. Moreover, following an academic course,
attending workgroups and preparing for an exam are naturally occurring events in
the life of university students.
In accordance with the ﬁndings reported by Gneezy and List (2006), we also ﬁnd
a diﬀerence between hot and cold decision-making. Participants in our experiment
initially responded to assignment to treatment, by being more likely to attend the
ﬁrst workgroup. This supports the interpretation that the diﬀerence in duration
17between our ﬁeld experiment and previous laboratory experiments/sports events is
responsible for the diﬀerence in ﬁndings.
An alternative explanation for the absence of any lasting eﬀect on eﬀort or an
eﬀect on productivity is that the stakes in the ﬁeld experiment are not suﬃciently
large. A ﬁrst piece of evidence against this alternative explanation is again our ﬁnd-
ing that those assigned to treatment were more likely to attend the ﬁrst workgroup.
If the stakes were too small, there is no reason why they would do so.
Second, in objective terms we think that the stakes are not small. In the low
prize tournaments 25 and 32 participants were competing for 1000 euros, in the
medium prize tournaments 58 and 59 participants were competing for 3000 euros
and in the high prize tournaments 56 and 69 participants were competing for 5000
euros. The expected value of exposure to treatment, assuming an equal probability
to win, thus ranges from 31 to 89 euros. In an earlier study Leuven et al. (2003)
found that freshmen at the University of Amsterdam earn about 7.5 euros per hour
in side jobs. At this wage, this means that (risk neutral) treated participants should
have put in 4 to 12 additional hours into the microeconomics course. This translates
into two to six extra workgroups attended. A response of that size would certainly
have been identiﬁed in our data, but we observe nothing of the kind. Moreover, if
there are only a few potential (high ability) winners then the stakes are much higher.
The tournament model as formulated by Lazear and Rosen is an attractive model.
With a simple mechanism it potentially explains a number of relevant features of
internal labor markets. The evidence in this paper, however, suggests that the eﬀort
inducing eﬀects of tournaments in rich and naturally occurring environments are less
straightforward than previously thought. It may thus be that ﬁrms run tournaments
not because they provide powerful incentives but because they sort more productive
workers into the ﬁrms that organize (higher prize) tournaments. This is comparable
to the results reported by Lazear (2000), who ﬁnds that half of the productivity gain
resulting from a switch from salaries to piece rates is due to sorting more productive
workers. From the point of view of an individual ﬁrm it may not matter so much
whether incentives are more important than sorting or vice versa. This issue has
however potentially important implications for social welfare.
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20A Appendix
Table A1: Regressions of score on reward size for controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Money/1000 0:690 2:296 2:165 2:338
(0:201) (0:440) (0:382) (0:380)




Ability   AbilityCompetitors 1:583
(0:271)
R-squared 0:04 0:10 0:24 0:24
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations equals 265. ***) signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level.
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